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Regions within the European Union differ substantially not only
with respect to per capita GDP, but also with respect to income in-
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1 Introduction
There is considerable inequality in terms of per capita income between Eu-
ropean Union members states. Countries from Central Eastern Europe and
Southern Europe are facing substantially lower per capita incomes than those
from Western and Northern Europe. Moreover, we do not only observe in-
come gaps between countries but unequally distributed incomes within coun-
tries.1 Inter- as well as intra-regional inequality contributed to a questioning
of the European integration project and also has put governments of single
countries under pressure. Policymakers are striving for measures to allevi-
ate these problems and a major pillar for fostering convergence of regions
has been the European Regional Development Funds (ERDF). Empirically,
however, the effectiveness of cohesion policy measures is contested (see e.g.
Boldrin and Canova, 2001; Cappelen et al., 2003; Becker et al., 2010; Aiello
and Pupo, 2012)
Since the eastern enlargement of the EU also the countries from Central
Eastern Europe have access to these policy measures. These countries lag
behind the Western European countries in terms of their per capita incomes.
Moreover, in these countries income inequality seems to have increased since
the fall of the iron curtain. Besides, they differ from the old member states
in various other respects that may be important for the effectiveness of the
cohesion policies. In particular, we see two potential candidates that may
contribute to a different unfolding of transfers in the Eastern European Coun-
tries. First, we observe that labor markets in countries from Central East-
ern Europe are characterized by an institutional setting different from the
Western European countries. In particular, there occurs to be put a higher
pressure on the unemployed to accept job offers as replacement rates in the
new EU member states are lower than in Western European countries (van
Vliet and Caminada, 2012) and more efforts seem to go into the activation
of the unemployed (OECD, 2007). Secondly, the absorptive capacity to turn
the transfers in per capita growth may differ from the old European coun-
tries. Here, we are mainly thinking along two dimensions. If firms receive
subsidies for the investment of latest technologies, the potential productivity
enhancements may not materialize due to a lack of human capital to actually
run these technologies. Furthermore, not properly working public adminis-
trations may make it difficult to implement the policy along the intended
lines. In conclusion, the measures within the ERDF are applied to a set of
countries that is distinct from the ones in Western Europe and the question
arises what we should expect in terms of the effects of the policies on these
1For more details, see our discussion in the following section.
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countries’ per capita incomes and the income distribution.
In this paper, we analyze to which extent technology-oriented cohesion
policies can help fostering convergence of per-capita incomes between regions
and how they affect intra-regional inequality. Investigating the role of ab-
sorptive capacity of the targeted region we are able to vary the degree to
which firms actually purchase technologies from the frontier, to control the
quality of human capital they are able to draw from, and to analyze the out-
comes of the technology policies with respect to the flexibility of the labor
market of the region receiving the transfers.
The analysis is conducted within the Eurace@Unibi agent-based macroe-
conomic model. We believe that an agent-based macroeconomic model is the
most appropriate tool to gain insights into the emergent dynamics with re-
spect to the average income per capita and the income distributions in these
regions. In particular the focus on implications of the policy on income in-
equality requires an approach able to capture the evolution of heterogeneities
within households and firms in a region.2 Whereas this evolution is naturally
captured in an agent-based model, it is hard to do so in dynamic equilibrium
models based on assumptions of representative agents. The Eurace@Unibi
model describes an economy containing labor, an investment and a consump-
tion goods sector, as well as a financial and a credit market in a regional con-
text. Capital good firms provide investment goods of different vintages and
productivities. Consumption good firms combine this capital with labor of
varying degrees of general and specific skills to produce a consumption good
that households purchase. Households’ saved income goes into the credit and
financial markets through which it is channeled to firms financing the pro-
duction of goods. This framework allows us to use a strongly micro-founded
model for the analysis of short-, medium- and long-run policy effects arising
from heterogeneous and interacting firms and workers in a spatial context.
We set up the model in a way that one region is initially endowed with a
capital stock whose technological level is close to the frontier, while the other
region’s capital shows a considerable gap which the technology-oriented co-
hesion policies aim to close. This setup aims to capture in a stylized way the
heterogeneity within the European Union with respect to productivity and
endowment with human and physical capital.
Within this framework we explore the implications of policies which re-
semble measures implemented within the European Regional Development
Fund (ERDF). The ERDF aims at strengthening economic and social cohe-
sion in the European Union. In total the ERDF had a budget of Euro 201bn
2Recent empirical work highlights the importance of heterogeneity of firms for the
explanation of income inequality in a region, see Faggio et al. (2010).
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for the period between 2007-2013. As all these programs are matching funds
the actual amount spent has to be doubled. Technology policies are a ma-
jor pillar of the ERDF that, by subsidizing firms’ investments, try to move
countries closer to the technological frontier. In particular, the program tries
to foster investment of firms in the target region in advanced technologies,
thereby improving the average quality of the physical capital stock in the
target region. 3 Empirical evidence for a success of the technological target-
ing of the measures, in the sense of an improvement of the average quality of
the firms’ physical capital is however missing.
Our calibrated model replicates, apart from a set of standard stylized facts
about Macroeconomic and Market Dynamics, in the bench-mark case without
(targeted) policies the non-convergence of regions at the bottom of the per-
capita income distribution as we have been observing it in Europe during
the last two decades. Moreover, it captures the pattern of the evolution of
the within income distribution of the wealthiest and the worst off countries
and the observation that inequality is larger in the low income countries.
Finally, the model also matches empirical observations about the effect of
labor market flexibility on output and inequality.
We apply technology oriented policies to the lagging low-tech regions
under different scenarios of labor market flexibility and are able to identify
a set of results with respect to the convergence of regions and the effect on
between and within regional income distribution. The technology policies
that are analyzed are differentiated along their effectiveness in incentivizing
firms to actually purchase investment goods from the technological frontier.
A non-targeted policy results in firms not purchasing latest technology which
changes as the policy becomes more targeted. Our main findings can be
summarized as follows:
1. Under an inflexible labor market in the low technology region all tech-
nology policies have positive impact on the dynamics of total output in
the economy. For a non-targeted policy the effect is positive in the high
technology region and also positive, but weaker, in the low technology
region. For sufficiently strongly targeted policies the effect is positive in
the low technology region, but negative in the high technology region.
3For illustrative purposes we sketch an example highlighting what we have in mind when
analyzing policies in our agent-based macroeconomic model. Here, a Portuguese firm with
about 500 employees received investment subsidies to improve on the quality of its capital
stock. The firm extracts ore and produces copper, lead and zinc concentrates. With the
funds it modernized its infrastructure to boost extraction of copper ore by constructing new
galleries to expand access to the ore, and upgraded the plant’s processing operations that
included facilities to wash the rock, treat and recycle water, and process waste material.
Source: http : //ec.europa.eu/regionalpolicy/projects/stories/indexde.cfm
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2. All technology policies reduce the overall income inequality in the econ-
omy. For a non-targeted policy inequality is persistently reduced only
in the high technology region. A sufficiently strongly targeted policy
reduces inequality in the low technology region but makes the income
distribution less equal in the high technology region.
3. The effects of the technology policies on output in the high technology
region is identical under the inflexible and flexible labor market sce-
nario. The (positive) effects on output in the low technology region is
substantially stronger under a flexible labor market.
4. If the labor market in the low technology region is flexible, the non-
targeted policy reduces intra-regional income inequality in both regions,
whereas (strongly) targeted policies increase inequality in both regions.
Effects on inequality are much stronger in the high technology region
than in the low technology region. Overall inequality in the economy
is reduced for all policies.
While stating these results at this point only, we will turn to an in-depth
analysis of the economic mechanisms underlying these findings in sections
4.3 and the following. There, it will be shown how the various policies spark
investment decisions of firms leading to wage and price reactions that result
in shifts in the relative demand for goods that distinct firms equipped with
particular technologies in the regions and within the regions can serve.
Our work is related to several streams of literature. The most important
ones are (i) the work on the relationship between inequality and growth,
(ii) the (mostly empirical) analyses of the effectiveness of European cohesion
policies and (iii) the literature on agent-based macroeconomic modeling.
The literature on the relationship between inequality and growth dates
back to Kuznets (1955) who argued for an inverted U-shaped relationship.
Initial work modeling the inequality and growth nexus (see Aghion et al.
(1999) for a survey) has argued along three different streams why inequal-
ity would foster growth. Firstly, if investments are linked to savings, and
richer households have a larger propensity to save, more income inequality
should be promoting growth through higher investments. Secondly, with
investments being characterized by considerable sunk costs, it needs large in-
vestors to make capital accumulation happen at all, and thirdly the trade-off
between equity and efficiency might be rooted in the incentives for workers.
An egalitarian income distribution, so the argument goes, might discourage
workers from making further efforts to climb up the income ladder.
Previously, empirical studies on the link between inequality and growth
have relied on cross-country growth regressions with inequality as an ex-
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planatory variable (see, e.g. Campano and Salvatore (2006) for a survey).
All these studies have provided a fairly robust body of evidence in favor of a
negative relationship between income inequality and growth. As better data
on income distributions and for a longer time span has become available,
however, evidence seems to have shifted suggesting a positive correlation be-
tween income inequality and growth. In particular, the negative correlation
seems to disappear if analyses are based on panel techniques as argued by
Dosi et al. (2008) in a meta-analysis on existing empirical studies on income
inequality and growth.
It occurs that existing studies in this strand of the literature have not
looked into the interaction of technology adoption of firms and learning pro-
cesses of workers to run these technologies, which eventually increases their
productivity and wages. Introspection of such a channel requires heteroge-
neous agents on the firm and worker side which is typically beyond standard
economic frameworks. It also requires to let aggregation processes through
the interaction of agents work themselves out, without restricting the out-
come by imposing an equilibrium condition on the model. In an agent-based
framework, as we propose it, none of these restrictions apply.
Empirical work on the effectiveness of European cohesion policies finds
mixed results. Studies taking a national perspective, such as Beugelsdijk
and Eijffinger (2005) detect positive effects of the Structural Funds Program
on GDP growth, or at least conditionally positive effects Ederveen et al.
(2006) meaning that growth rates rise for countries with good institutions.
For studies using disaggregated regional data, the findings with respect to
the growth effects are inconclusive. One of the earliest attempts to evaluate
the role of the Structural Funds Programme can be found in Boldrin and
Canova (2001). They analyzed NUTS 2 data for 221 regions for the years
1980 to 1996, finding that disparities between regions were neither growing
nor decreasing, and that EU policies have little relationship with fostering
growth. Contrarily, also using sub-national data, Cappelen et al. (2003), for
example, find positive growth effects. Ramajo et al. (2008) provide evidence
for spatial convergence clubs in Europe, and faster conditional convergence
in relative income of cohesion-fund countries, i.e. Ireland, Greece, Portugal,
and Spain. Finally, Becker et al. (2010) detect positive growth effects for
so-called Objective 1 transfers within the structural program but no effects
on regional employment. In a follow up, Becker et al. (2013) show that only
regions with sufficient human capital and good-enough institutions are able
to turn the transfers into higher per capita income growth and investment.
Reasons for the differing findings may be that the data employed refers
to various levels of disaggregation, and that some studies look into the over-
all effect of the EU funding while others evaluated more specific programs.
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We believe that our simulation based approach to evaluating these policies
is complementary to these empirical studies. It allows us to look into the
effectiveness of policies under different time-horizons, let’s us analyze out-
come variables for which data very often does not exist, and perhaps, most
importantly, allows for an investigation of the economic mechanisms under-
lying the policy outcomes. Finally, our setting allows to carry out counter
factual policy experiments, thereby evaluating policy proposals without ac-
tually implementing them.
In the last ten years a number of closed macroeconomic models using an
agent-based approach have been developed (see, e.g., Gintis (2007); Dosi et al.
(2010); Delli Gatti et al. (2010); Ashraf et al. (2011); Raberto et al. (2012);
Wolf et al. (2012)). Several of these agent-based macroeconomic models
have shown the importance of the approach for economic policy design. For
example, the effect of labor market integration policies on the convergence of
regions has been analyzed by Dawid et al. (2012a) and in Dawid et al. (2013)
the effectiveness of human capital and technology policies as instruments of
cohesion policy have been compared. Dosi et al. (2010) have looked into the
(long run) effects of policies aiming at the strengthening of demand and of
policies facilitating the speed of technological change as well the interaction
of these polices. Monetary policies are addressed in Ashraf et al. (2013)
or Arifovic et al. (2012), whereas regulatory issues relating to credit and
financial markets have been analyzed by Delli Gatti et al. (2010) or Ashraf
et al. (2011) within agent-based macroeconomic models. We differ from the
existing agent-based macroeconomic models as our set-up jointly features a
spatial dimension and technology adoption by firms which is complementary
to an evolving stock of specific skills within a firm.
In section 2 we will outlay what as we argue are some of the characteriz-
ing features of European economies with respect to convergence and income
inequality. The following section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 starts
with a description and motivation of the policy treatments. We continue by
showing and analyzing the simulation output for a baseline model without
policy intervention to which we then relate the effects arising from the policy
analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Inequality and convergence in Europe
To which extent did European economies converge and how has income in-
equality evolved in these countries? We try to investigate this question by
descriptively analyzing per capita incomes for 24 countries of the European
7
Union.4 In 1989 the iron curtain started to fall. Eventually it implied that
economies became more integrated. Product markets opened up and firms’
access in lagging countries to latest technologies improved significantly. It
occurs to us that the early nineties are a good starting point to look into
economic convergence of the countries having been on one or the other side
of the iron curtain.
Sorting countries along their GDP per capita in 1990, it turns out that
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, and Sweden made
up the upper quartile with an average per capita income in US dollars (as of
2005 prices) of about 27.000 in 1990 (see figure 2 panel (a)). In these countries
per capita income steadily increased since then to an average of about 36.000
US dollars in the year 2009. Countries in the lower quartile of the per capita
income distribution (as of 1990) which happen to be all countries from the
other side of the iron curtain (Bulgaria , Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
and Slovakia) had an average per capita income of less than 10.000 US dollar.
These countries grew in the upcoming 20 years but could by no means close
or even diminish the gap with respect to the countries at the frontier. A third
group of countries from Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain),
in which we are mainly interested here because they feature less flexible labor
markets as compared to the rest of the European countries, exhibit per capita
incomes somewhere in the middle of the other two groups. Again, we do not
observe a catching up process to the frontier.
How did these groups of economies fare in terms of income inequality?
Panel (b) of figure 2 tries to give some insight although it has to be ac-
knowledged that comparable and also reliable time series data on income
distributions are hard to come by. Typically, Gini coefficients are calculated
on the basis of in-comparable income sources, the data sources itself are not
always of high quality, and representativeness is an open question. We re-
strict ourselves to data based on disposable income because it covers for the
countries under investigation here the largest time span. The calculation of
the means of the Gini coefficients for the three groups of countries excludes
Romania as no comparable data occurs to be available.
After an initial spike mainly driven by the unifying Germany, high income
countries have had rather stable income distributions with Gini coefficients of
slightly more than 0.25. Simultaneously we observe a marked increase in the
4We excluded four of the 28 members of the EU for the following reasons. Data on
Croatia for the first years of the 90’s is not available as it fought a war of secession
with former Yugoslavia after having declared independence in 1991. Luxemburg has been
excluded from the analysis as it constitutes an outlier, possibly because of its peculiar
tax policy to attract foreign capital. Finally, no GDP data is available for Latvia and
Lithuania for the year 1990.
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average of the Gini coefficients of the low income countries which leveled off
during the second part of the nineties but increased again in the second half of
the last decade. Throughout the considered time period the Gini coefficients
for the country groups with low per capita incomes indicate a much more
unequal distribution compared to the high income countries. The countries
from Southern Europe, which combine per capita income between the other
two groups with inflexible labor markets, feature income distributions with
even higher inequality than the low income countries.
In the remainder we will present an agent-based macroeconomic model
which is able to replicate these developments. We will then use the framework
to do policy analysis by studying subsidy schemes for firms’ investments and
their effect on the convergence of regions and the within regional income
distribution.
3 The Model
3.1 Overall Structure
The Eurace@Unibi model describes an economy containing labor, an invest-
ment and a consumption goods sector, and a financial and a credit market
in a regional context. Capital good firms provide investment goods of dif-
ferent vintages and productivities. Consumption good firms combine this
capital and labor of varying degrees of general and specific skills to produce
a consumption good that households purchase. Households’ saved income
goes into the credit and financial markets through which it is channeled to
firms financing the production of goods. Due to space constraint we will in
this section only describe the main aspects of the model, which are crucial
for the understanding of the results discussed below.A detailed description
of the entire model is provided in Dawid et al. (2012b).
Capital goods of different quality are provided by capital goods producers
with infinite supply. The technological frontier (i.e. the quality of the best
currently available capital good) improves over time, where technological
change is driven by a stochastic (innovation) process. Firms in the consump-
tion goods sector use capital goods combined with labor input to produce
consumption goods. The labor market is populated with workers that have
a finite number of general skill levels and acquire specific skills on the job,
which they need to fully exploit the technological advantages of the capital
employed in the production process. Every time when consumption goods
producers invest in new capital goods they decide which quality of capital
goods to select, thereby determining the speed by which new technologies
9
10
00
0
20
00
0
30
00
0
40
00
0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
lower quartile upper quartile
southern european
25
30
35
1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
lower quartile upper quartile
southern european
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Mean GDP per capita at 2005 constant prices (US dollars) of
European countries in upper and lower quartile of GDP per capita distribu-
tion as of 1990, and for Southern European countries. Data source: Penn
World Tables; (b) Mean of Gini coefficients based on disposable income of
countries in upper and lower quartile of GDP per capita distribution (as of
1990), and for Southern European countries. Data source: World Income In-
equality Database, United Nations University – WIDER World Institute for
Development Economics Research; countries included in upper quartile are
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden; countries
included in lower quartile are Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Roma-
nia (not in mean for Gini), and Slovakia; Southern European countries are
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
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spread in the economy. Consumption goods are sold at local market plat-
forms (called malls), where firms store and offer their products and consumers
come to buy goods at posted prices. Labor market interaction is described
by a simple multi-round search-and-matching procedure where firms post va-
cancies, searching workers apply, firms make offers and workers accept/reject.
Wages of workers are determined, on the one hand, by the expectation the
employer has at the time of hiring about the level of specific skills of the
worker, and, on the other hand, by a base wage variable, which is influenced
by the (past) tightness of the labor market and determines the overall level of
wages paid by a particular employer. Banks collect deposits from households
and firms and give credits to firms. The interest that firms have to pay on
the amount of their loan depends on the financial situation of the firm, and
the amount of the loan might be restricted by the bank’s liquidity and risk
exposure. There is a financial market where shares of single asset are traded,
namely an index bond containing all firms in the economy. The dividend
paid by each share at a certain point in time is determined by the sum of the
dividends currently paid by all firms. The central bank provides standing
facilities for the banks at a given base rate, pays interest on banks’ overnight
deposits and might provide fiat money to the government.
Firms that are not able to pay the financial commitments declare il-
liquidity. Furthermore, if at the end of the production cycle the firm has
negative net worth, the firm is insolvent and insolvency bankruptcy is de-
clared. In both cases it goes out of business, stops all productive activities
and all employees loose their jobs. The firm writes off a fraction of its debt
with all banks with which it has a loan and stays idle for a certain period
before it becomes active again.
The spatial extensions of the markets differ. The capital goods market
is global meaning that firms in all regions buy from the same global capital
good producer and therefore have access to the same technologies. On the
consumption goods market demand is determined locally in the sense that all
consumers buy at the local mall located in their region, but supply is global
because every firm might sell its products in all regional markets of the
economy. Labor markets are characterized by spatial frictions determined by
commuting costs that arise if workers accept jobs outside their own region. It
is assumed that firms have access to all banks in the economy and, therefore,
credit markets operate globally.
The choice of the decision rules in the Eurace@Unibi model is based on
a systematic attempt to incorporate rules that resemble empirically observ-
able behavior documented in the relevant literature. Concerning households,
this means that for example empirically identified saving rules are used and
purchasing choices are described using models from the Marketing litera-
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ture with strong empirical support. With respect to firm behavior we follow
the ’Management Science Approach’, which aims at implementing relatively
simple decision rules that match standard procedures of real world firms as
described in the corresponding management literature. A more extensive
discussion of the Management Science approach can be found in Dawid and
Harting (2012).
Agent actions can be time-driven or event-based, where the former can fol-
low either subjective or objective time schedules. Furthermore, the economic
activities take place on a hierarchy of time-scales: yearly, monthly, weekly
and daily activities all take place following calendar-time or subjective agent-
time. Agents are activated asynchronously according to their subjective time
schedules that is anchored on an individual activation day. These activation
days are uniformly randomly distributed among the agents at the start of
the simulation, but may change endogenously (e.g., when a household gets
re-employed, its subjective month gets synchronized with the activation day
of its employer due to wage payments). This modeling approach is supposed
to capture the decentralized and typically asynchronous nature of decision
making processes and activities of economic agents.
3.2 Agents, Markets, and Decisions
3.2.1 Output Decision and Production
Consumption goods producers need physical capital and labor for production.
A firm i has a capital stock Ki,t that is composed of different vintages v with
v = 1, ..., Vt, where Vt denotes the number of available vintages a time t. The
accumulation of physical capital by a consumption goods producer follows
Kvi,t+1 = (1− δ)Kvi,t + Ivi,t (1)
where δ is the depreciation rate and Ivi,t ≥ 0 is the gross investment in vintage
v.
The production technology in the consumption goods sector is represented
by a Leontief type production function with complementarities between the
qualities of the different vintages of the investment good and the specific skill
level of employees for using these vintages. Vintages are deployed for pro-
duction in descending order by using the best vintage first. For each vintage
the effective productivity is determined by the minimum of its productivity
and the average level of relevant specific skills of the workers. Accordingly,
output for a consumption goods producer is given by
Qi,t =
Vt∑
v=1
min
[
Kvi,t,max
[
0, Li,t −
Vt∑
k=v+1
Kki,t
]]
·min [Av, Bi,t] , (2)
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where Av is the productivity of vintage v and Bi,t denotes the average specific
skill level in firms as explained in more detail in Section 3.2.3. The fact that
the considered production function takes into account the vintage structure
of the capital stock and that firms select among different available vintages
enables us to capture the effect of workers’ skills on the incentives of firms
to invest into new technologies (see Section 3.2.4).
Once every month each firm determines the quantities to be produced
and delivered to each regional mall the firm is serving. Actual demand for
the product of a firm in a given mall and a given month is stochastic (see
below) and there are stock-out costs, because consumers intending to buy
the product of a firm move on to buy from a different producer in case the
firm’s stock at the mall is empty. Therefore, the firm faces a production
planning problem with stochastic demand and stock-out cost. The simplest
standard heuristic used in the corresponding Operations Management liter-
ature prescribes to generate an estimation of the distribution of demand and
then choose the planned stock level after delivery such that the (estimated)
stock-out probability during the following month equals a given parameter
value (which is influenced by stock-out costs, inventory costs and risk atti-
tude of the firm (see e.g. Silver et al. (1998)). Firms in the Eurace@Unibi
model follow this simple heuristic, thereby generating a target production
quantity for the considered month. Based on the target production quantity
the firm determines the desired input quantities of physical capital and labor.
Realizing this production plan might induce the need to buy new physical
capital, hire new labor or to obtain additional credit. While there is infinite
supply of physical capital the firm might be rationed on the labor and credit
market. In this case the firm accordingly adjusts its production quantity
downwards.
3.2.2 Pricing Decision
Consumption goods producers set the price of their products once a year
which is consistent with empirical observations (see, e.g., Fabiani et al.,
2006). The pricing rule is inspired by the price setting described in Nagle and
Hogan (2006, ch.7), a standard volume on strategic pricing in the Managerial
literature. Firms seek for a profit-maximizing price taking into account the
trade-off between price, sales and costs.
To obtain an indication of the effect of price changes on sales the con-
sumption goods producers carry out simulated purchase surveys (see Nagle
and Hogan, 2006, pp. 300). A representative sample of households is asked
to compare a firm’s product with the set of the currently available rival
products for a range of prices. Households’ answers are based on the same
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decision rules they use for their real purchasing decisions. Based on the re-
sulting demand estimations and cost considerations firms choose the price
which maximizes their expected discounted profit stream over their planing
horizons.
3.2.3 Adjustment of Specific Skills of Workers
Each worker h has two dimensions of human capital endowments namely
an exogenously given general skill level bgenh and an endogenously increasing
specific skill level bh,t. General skills can be interpreted as formal qualification
or general embodied abilities while specific skills are experiences or abilities
obtained on-the-job reflecting the productivity of each worker. For simplicity
it is assumed that only two general skill levels exist bgen ∈ {1, 2}, where
bgen refers to the general skill level. General skills are observable by firms
in the hiring process while specific skills are not. They become observable
during the production process. Acquisition of specific skills in the production
is faster for the higher general skills. Formally, the workers increase the
specific skills over time during production by a learning process. The speed
of learning depends on the general skill level bgenh of the worker h and the
average quality of the technology Ai,t used by employer i:
bh,t+1 = bh,t + χ(b
gen
h ) ·max[0, Ai,t − bh,t]. (3)
Here bh,t are the specific skills of worker h in period t and χ(bgenh ) increases
with general skills bgenh and 0 < χ(b
gen
h ) < 1. The distribution of general
skills in a region is deliberately kept exogenous in the model, since the ef-
fect of changes in this distribution is one of the key policy experiments in
our analysis. Endogenizing the general skill distribution in a region would
require an explicit representation of educational choices and the inclusion of
an education sector, which would make the model much more complex and
is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.2.4 Technological Change
The supply of the capital goods and the process of technological change is
modeled in a very simplified stylized way, since the focus of our analysis lies
on the interaction of the dynamics on the labor and consumption goods mar-
kets. There is a monopolistic capital goods firm that offers different vintages
of the capital good v = 1, ..., Vt, which differ regarding their productivity Av,
at infinite supply. This firm is therefore able to satisfy all emerging capital
demand of consumption goods firms. Furthermore, the capital good is pro-
duced without input factor requirements and, in order to close the model,
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all revenues are channeled back into the economy by distributing them to
households in the form of dividends. New vintages become available over
time following a stochastic process. To avoid spurious growth effects, due
to stochastic differences in the dynamic of the technological frontier between
runs, we use the identical realization of the stochastic process governing the
emergence of new vintages in all considered runs.
The pricing of the vintages is modeled as a combination of cost-based and
value-based pricing, where the growth rate in the first term follows the growth
rate of average labor costs and the value-based price component estimates
the value that each vintage has for a reference firm whose workforce consists
of the economy wide average levels for the specific skills as well as general
skills.
3.2.5 Investment and Vintage Choice
If consumption good producers have a target output level which cannot be
produced with their current capital stock, they acquire new capital. To
this end, a consumption goods firm has to choose from the set of available
vintages. For the decision in which vintage to invest the complementarity
between specific skills and technology plays an important role: due to the
inertia of the specific skill adaptation, the effective productivity of a vintage
with Av > Bi,t is initially below its quality. It converges to Av over time
as the specific skills of workers at the firm catch-up to the quality of the
vintage. Therefore, the firm computes a discounted sum of estimated effec-
tive productivities over a fixed time horizon S. The specific skill evolution is
estimated for each time step within [t, t+S] using (3), where the firm inserts
its average general and specific skill values. A logit choice model based on
the ratio of the estimated effective productivity and price for each available
vintage determines which vintage is ordered. In several parts of the Eu-
race@Unibi model choices of decision makers are described by logit models.
These models are well suited to capture decisions where individuals try to
maximize some objective function which depends on some variables common
to all decision makers and are explicitly represented in the model, as well as
on aspects that are idiosyncratic to each decision maker and captured in the
model by a stochastic term.
3.2.6 Labor Market Interaction
If the current workforce of a firm is not sufficient to produce its target output,
the firm posts vacancies for production workers. The wage it offers has two
constituent parts. The first part is the market driven base wage wbasei,t . The
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base wage is paid per unit of specific skill. If the firm cannot fill its vacancies
and the number of unfilled vacancies exceeds some threshold v > 0 the firm
raises the base wage offer by a fraction ϕ to attract more workers, i.e.
wbasei,t+1 = (1 + ϕ)w
base
i,t . (4)
The second part is related to the specific skills. Since the specific skills
represent the (maximal) productivity of the employees the wage wi,t is higher
for higher specific skills. For each of the general-skill groups the firm i offers
different wages wOi,t,g in period t. The wage offers are given by
wOi,t,g = w
base
i,t ×min[Ai,tB¯i,t−1,g] (5)
where B¯i,t−1,g are the average specific skills of all employees with general
skill g in the firm. The underlying assumption of this determination of wage
offers is that firms can observe general but not specific skills of job applicants.
Therefore they use the average specific skills of all employees with general
skill g in the firm in order to estimate the specific skills of an applicant with
general skill level g. This wage setting rule is a reduced form representation
of the outcome of firm-level wage negotiations taking into account workers’
expected productivity in the firm as well as workers’ outside option.
An unemployed worker takes the wage offers posted by searching firms
into consideration and compares them with his reservation wage wRh,t. An
unemployed worker will only apply at a firm that makes a wage offer such
that
(1− c)wOi,t,g > wRh,t, (6)
where wRh,t denotes the reservation wage of the worker and c ∈ [0, 1] captures
the commuting costs. If workers and employers are in the same region we
have c = 0. Since labor movement between European countries is still very
small5 we assume in our policy analysis below that c = 1, which means that
commuting costs are so high that workers search only for jobs in their own
region.
The level of the reservation wage is determined by the current wage if
the worker is employed, and in case of an unemployed worker by his previous
wage, where the reservation wage declines with the duration of unemploy-
ment. The reservation wage never falls below the level of unemployment
benefits. If the unemployed worker receives one or more job offers he accepts
the job offer with the highest wage offer. In case he does not receive any job
offers he remains unemployed.
5In 2010, only 2.8% of working-age European citizens lived in another EU member
state (see European Commission (2011)).
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In case the workforce of a firm is too large relative to its target output
level, the firm adjusts its number of workers, where employees with low gen-
eral skills are dismissed first. Additionally, there is a small probability for
each worker-employee match to be separated in each period. This should
capture job separations due to reasons not explicitly modeled.
3.2.7 Consumption Market Interaction
The consumption goods market is modeled as a decentralized goods market.
Each local market is represented by a mall at which the consumption goods
producers can offer and sell their products to their customers. While firms
are free to serve all malls regardless their spatial proximity, households always
choose the mall which is located in their region.
Households go shopping once a week and try to spend their entire weekly
consumption budget for one good. The consumption budget is determined
using a (piecewise) linear consumption rule according to the buffer-stock
approach (see Carroll (1997) and Allen and Carroll (2001)). At the begin-
ning of their shopping procedure they get information about the prices of all
available goods at the mall, but they get no information about the available
quantities. The decision which good to buy is described using a logit-choice
model with strong empirical foundation in the Marketing literature (see e.g.
Malhotra (1984)). An important parameter in this respect is the coefficient
of the price of a good in the logit choice function. This parameter, denoted
as γC , governs the price sensitivity of consumers and therefore the intensity
of competition between the consumption good producers.
Households have a-synchronized shopping days and thus on each day of
the months there is in general some shopping activity in each mall. The
consumption requests for the different goods are collected by the mall and, if
the total demand for one good exceeds its mall inventory level then the mall
has to ration the demand. In this case the mall sets a rationing quota cor-
responding to the percentage of the total demand that can be satisfied with
the available goods. Each household receives then the indicated percentage
of the requested consumption good.
After the shopping activity rationed households may still have left over
a part of their budget. Those households have the opportunity to spend the
remaining budget for another good in a second shopping loop. In this case
the shopping process is repeated as described above.
The production of the consumption goods firm follows a fixed time sched-
ule with fixed production and delivery dates. Even if the mall stock is com-
pletely sold out it can only be refilled at the fixed delivery date. Consequently,
all the demand that exceeds the expected value of the monthly sales plus the
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additional buffer cannot be satisfied.
3.2.8 Public Expenditures and Taxes
The public sector is modeled in a parsimonious way. In each region the
government pays the unemployment benefits, where the monthly amount an
unemployed receives is determined by the last wage earned by worker and the
replacement rate in the region. As discussed in more detail below, motivated
by observed differences within European countries we will consider different
level of these replacement rates. In addition the policy measures discussed in
the next section are financed by public funds. In particular, the total amount
of firm subsidies paid out under these policy measures is financed to 100 % by
a common fund of the economic union jointly endowed by both regions, where
the contribution of each region is proportional to its GDP. The remaining part
is financed by the government in the target region. This setting captures in
a stylized manner the way funds like the ERDF are financed by the member
countries of the European Union. The public expenditures in each region
are fully financed by an income tax. In each period the government collects
an income tax from households and a corporate tax from firms (if they have
positive profits in that period). For simplicity it is assumed that the tax
rate, denoted as τr,t for region r at time t, is identical for both types of taxes.
Governments in all regions aim at a balanced budget and adjust the tax
rates over time. The adjustment process follows a backward-looking budget
planning, i.e. the tax rate for the current period t, τr,t, is chosen such that
ex-post the tax revenue and the government spending of a previous time
period are balanced. This time horizon has to be sufficiently long in order to
avoid highly volatile tax rates due to short-term fluctuations in the tax basis
or the government spending (here we use a time horizon of 72 months).
3.3 Parametrization and Validation
In order to determine the values and ranges of parameters to be used in the
policy experiments we follow an approach that combines direct estimation
of parameters for which empirical observations are available with an indi-
rect calibration approach in order to establish confidence in the ability of
the model to capture economic mechanisms which are relevant for real world
economic dynamics. Standard constellations have been identified, where val-
ues of parameters are chosen to reflect empirical evidence whenever possible
and where a large set of stylized facts can be reproduced. Furthermore, the
fact that the development of the Eurace@Unibi model follows as far as pos-
sible the Management Science approach, briefly discussed above, provides
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empirical grounding to individual decision rules, thereby addressing the im-
portant point of empirical micro-foundations for modeled behavior. The set
of macroeconomic stylized facts that have been reproduced by the standard
constellations of the Eurace@Unibi model includes persistent growth, low
positive inflation and a number of important business cycle properties: per-
sistent fluctuations of output; pro-cyclical movement of employment, con-
sumption and investment, where relative sizes of amplitudes qualitatively
match those reported e.g. in Stock and Watson (1999), counter-cyclical
movement of wages and firm mark-ups. On the industry level the model
generates persistent heterogeneity in firm-size, profit rates, productivity and
prices in accordance with empirical observations reported e.g. in Dosi et al.
(1997). Also labor market regularities, like the Beveridge curve, are repro-
duced by the model with benchmark parameter constellations. The reader is
referred to Dawid et al. (2012b) for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
Tables with the list of parameter values used in the simulations underlying
this paper are provided in the Online-Appendix.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the analysis in the next section will
show that the calibrated version of the model does not only qualitatively
reproduce the empirical patterns of the evolution and the relative size of
per capita output in different types of economies shown in figure 2 (a), but
also the patterns of income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. In
particular, the model not only reproduces that low technology regions have
lower per-capita output and higher Gini coefficients than high technology
regions, but also the observation that the regions with relatively inflexible
labor markets are characterized by larger income inequality compared to the
low tech regions with flexible labor markets, although their per capita output
is higher. All these stylized facts have been reproduced although they have
not been targeted in the calibration and the parameter setting has not been
adjusted from the default setting described above.
4 Policy analysis
4.1 Experimental set-up
Our policy experiments are addressing convergence between an advanced
and a lagging region (country) and the evolution of the distribution of income
within a region in a two-region version of the model described above. Table 1
summarizes the initializations of the key variable for the two distinct regions
R1 and R2. At time t = 0 the quality of the capital stock in the high
tech region R1 is set to 1.5, and to 1.0 in the low tech region. The choice
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Table 1: Initialization of capital stock and skills
Region 1 (R1): high tech Region 2 (R2): low tech
Initial quality of capital stock 1.5 1.0
Initial specific skills 1.5 1.0
General skill distribution 0.8/0.2 0.2/0.8
of the (adapting) specific skills corresponds initially to the quality of the
capital stock. In R1 80% of the workers have high general skills, and the
remaining part has low general skills. For R2 the general skill distribution
is inverted. This setting is supposed to capture in a very simple way that
on average workers in the high tech region 1 adjust faster to an increase in
the quality of the physical capital they are working with than workers in
region 2. The technological frontier at t = 0 is set to a quality of 1.7 and
afterward grows at an annual rate of 1.8 percent. Firms in both regions may
purchase an investment good of that quality, i.e. investment goods markets
are integrated from the beginning of the simulation. The same holds for the
consumption goods markets.
Within this setup we mimic the European Union technology policies by
introducing a subsidy for investments of firms in the target region R2. The
subsidy covers 20% of the expenses of the firm for the purchase of the new
physical capital. In particular, we consider in our experiments four different
variations of technology policies, which differ with respect to their influence
on the technology choice of the firms receiving the subsidy. We define by 0 ≤
α ≤ 1 the probability that a firm receiving a subsidy under the policy acquires
the latest vintage directly on the frontier regardless of whether this would be
the vintage choice according to its own vintage choice rule. With probability
1 − α the firm follows its standard vintage choice rule. In the experiments
we consider the values α = 0, which is denoted as non-targeted technology
policy, as well as the cases α = 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3, corresponding to an increase
in the direct influence of the policy on the firms’ vintage choice. The reason
to consider these different policy variations is twofold. First, even if the
policymaker’s intention is to only subsidize firm’s investments if they are of
the high quality vintage type, it is in general difficult for the policymaker
to determine what is exactly the frontier technology for a given firm. This
makes the enforcement of the highest vintage constraint problematic and it
is important to understand how crucial it is for the effect of the policy if
no perfect enforcement is possible. This experimental set-up may be seen in
relation to the literature that studies the role of absorptive capacity for the
effectiveness of transfers. While this line of investigation has been playing a
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prominent role in the evaluation of aid policies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000),
it has become of interest in the context of analyzing the effectiveness of EU
funds only recently (see, e.g., Becker et al., 2013). Second, a-priori it is
not clear whether it is actually useful for convergence that a policy tries
to influence the vintage choice of firms in a way that they acquire high
vintages that they would not have selected without external pressure. Our
analysis intends to shed light on this question by comparing non-targeted
with targeted subsidy policies.
The targeted and the non-targeted technology policy is studied for two
labor market regimes. In one scenario we assume in both regions a relatively
high wage replacement rate (70%) and also assume that the reservation wages
of unemployed workers adjust at a speed we can empirically observe in West-
ern European countries.6 In the second scenario we analyze the effect of
technology policies under the assumption that replacement rates in the low-
tech region R2 are much lower (55%) and reservation wages adjust much
faster there. The motivation for the consideration of this second treatment
is that empirically replacement rates in many of the new EU member states
from Eastern Europe are much lower than in Western European countries
and labor markets tend to be more flexible.7 The faster adjusting reser-
vation wages may reflect the consequences of various labor market policies
of the more recent past that aim at integrating unemployed workers more
quickly into the labor market. Examples of such policies are the reduction of
the duration of unemployment benefit payments to worker, tighter controls
of unemployed workers’ search intensity through employment agencies, or the
introduction of the obligation to accept job offers that are below a worker’s
skills.8
For each of the considered policies 20 runs are conducted in both labor
market scenarios, with each run encompassing 1400 months. For each policy
the time series are pooled across labor market scenarios and the policy effects
are estimated using penalized spline methods (see, e.g., Kauermann et al.,
2009). More technically, the isolated effects and the interacted effects of a
6We use the findings in Burda and Mertens (2001) on wage losses of 17% after spells
of unemployment in Germany assuming an average duration of 30 weeks.
7Whereas the average net replacement rates for one earner families with two children
slightly increased from the beginning of the seventies starting at about 65% for two per-
centage points for the old EU member states, the average over the new members states
of the EU declined from above 60% to about 55%, recently, see van Vliet and Caminada
(2012).
8In its 2007 Employment Outlook (OECD, 2007) the OECD surveys the various mea-
sures that have been taken by countries to activate the unemployed concluding that efforts
to speed up re-employment are on a rise.
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policy are evaluated by estimating the equation
Yt,p,i = s(t) + I[p(LM)=1]sFlex(t) + I[p(Tech)=1]sTech(t) + I[p(LM)=p(Tech)=1]sInt(t)
+η0i + η
1
i t+ εt,p,i, (7)
where Yt,p,i is the outcome variable at iteration t, for policy p, and run i.
The baseline spline is s(t) to which the policy splines are added with dummy
variables I indicating if the policy is turned on or off. The linear term
involving η0i and η1i captures run-specific random effects and εt,p,i is the error
term. The standard deviation of the spline estimates will also be plotted
in the figures in order to illustrate significance of the different policy effects
over time. The effect over time of the policy in the scenario with an inflexible
labor market in region R2 is given by sTech(t). The difference in the policy
effect between the two labor market scenarios is captured in sInt(t), which
implies that the policy effect under a flexible labor market can be seen by
considering sTech(t) + sInt(t). Finally, sFlex(t) gives an estimate of the effect
of increased labor market flexibility on the considered variable in the base
scenario without policy. 9
4.2 The baseline scenario
We proceed by showing that our agent-based macroeconomic model is able
to replicate the stylized developments in terms of per capita income between
regions and income inequality within regions as outlined before. Once, the
behavior of the baseline model is explained we will go into the policy analysis
applying the technology policies to our model, and augmenting it with an
analysis of the technology effects under different schemes of reservation wage
flexibility.
Figure (2) shows output per capita in the left panel and Gini coefficients –
our measure for income inequality– in the right panel for the advanced (black
line) and lagging regions (regions). The lagging region 2 never accomplished
to close the gap in terms of per capita income to region 1. After about 120
years income in region 1 is seven times higher where income in region 2 has
only tripled. Initially, this process of income divergence between regions is
accompanied by an increasing income inequality within regions. However,
9All figures are based on estimations using the R function gamm() from the package
mgcv (see e.g. Wood (2011)). Although residuals in our estimation show some autocorre-
lation we abstain from estimating a computationally much more intensive and less stable
model with AR(p) structure of the noise terms. Krivobokova and Kauermann (2007)
have shown that the spline estimations are robust with respect to mis-specified correlation
structures, and therefore no qualitative changes of our results should be expected even if
a model with more elaborated correlation structure would be used.
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Figure 2: Dynamics of output (a) and Gini coefficient (b) in both regions
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Figure 3: relative prices R1 to R2 (a), relative unit labor costs R1 to R2 (b),
relative wage offer (c)
income inequality starts declining in region 1 after about 40 years. Over the
whole time span the distributions of incomes within regions feature higher
inequality in the low income region. All these patterns are in accordance with
the empirical evidence as presented in figure 2, where we interpret region 2 as
a representative of the group of southern European countries with relatively
inflexible labor markets.
What stands behind these developments can be explained with the help of
Figure 3. Key for understanding the non-convergence is the inability of firms
in region 2 to become competitive with firms in region 1. Plotting goods
prices of region 1 relative to those of region 2 highlights that firms in region
2 have to charge higher prices on average which feeds back on that region’s
overall demand as households will prefer to purchase the less expensive goods.
Firms in region 2 charge higher prices as they face higher unit labor costs
over the whole time span considered (panel b).
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That firms in region 2 have on average higher unit labor costs than firms
in region 1 is due to an intricate wage process taking place in region 2. Region
2 is characterized by two groups of firms. On the one hand, we have firms that
employ high quality capital close to the technological frontier. These firms
have capital endowments very similar to the firms in the advanced region 1.
They are able to pay relatively high wages in line with their workers’ above
average productivity. On the other hand, we have firms in region 2 which
are technologically lagging behind but try to hire workers from the same
(regional or country specific) labor market. The relatively high wages paid
by technologically advanced firms in region 2 push up workers’ reservation
wages. Once a worker employed by one of these well performing firms loses
his job, he will have a reservation wage reflecting his former wage paid. This
implies for the lagging firms that they have to increase their base wage offers
to successfully bid for workers. Consequently, their labor costs increase,
and as they do not have high quality capital, higher labor costs cannot be
covered by higher productivity. Also, in spite of the relatively high base wage
offers the low-technology firms pay, they are not able to attract at a large
scale workers with high general and specific skills. This in turn keeps their
incentives to invest in advanced technologies low and the strong heterogeneity
of firms in region 2 is preserved and actually grows over time. Panels (a) to
(c) of Figure 4 illustrate this mechanism by devising the ratios of several
key variables between the average value of firms operating with technologies
above the median in region 2 and the average value of firms operating with
technologies below the median. Panel (a) demonstrates that the low-tech
firms indeed pay higher base wages and therefore charge higher prices (Panel
(b)). The persistent substantial difference in specific skills of workers at high-
tech relative to low-tech firms in region 2 is demonstrated in Panel (c). A
similar picture would emerge if general rather than specific skills would be
considered, but we abstain from showing this figure here.
4.3 Effects of Technology Policies
In this subsection we discuss the implications of the different technology
policies for output and (inter- and intra-regional) inequality under inflexible
labor markets in the target region. The case of flexible labor markets will be
covered in the following subsection. We structure our analysis such that we
state several main qualitative insights obtained from our simulation experi-
ments as ’Results’. Then for each of these results we provide the statistical
analysis backing the result as well as a discussion of the economic mecha-
nisms that are responsible for the observed finding.
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Figure 4: relative wage offers (high-tech/low-tech firms) in R2 (a), relative
prices in R2 (b), relative level of specific skills in R2 (c)
Result 1: Under an inflexible labor market in the low-tech region all tech-
nology policies have positive impact on the dynamics of total output in the
economy. For a non-targeted policy the effect is positive in the high technol-
ogy region and also positive, but weaker, in the low technology region. For
sufficiently strongly targeted policies the effect is positive in the low technol-
ogy region, but negative in the high technology region.
Evidence for the observations in Result 1 is provided in figures 5 (a)-(c).
The first panel shows the effect of the various technology policies on global
output (adding up regions 1 and 2) for our default scenario, whereas the two
other panels give the effects in each of the two regions. This figure, as well
as most of the following figures in this section, relies on the penalized spline
approach discussed above to show the dynamic effects of the different poli-
cies. Solid lines show the mean effect and dashed lines give the confidence
interval. The global output effect is positive even for a non-targeted policy
but clearly trumped by all variants of targeted policies. A similar qualitative
picture arises for the target region R2, however for the high-tech region R1
the implications of the policy change not only quantitatively but also quali-
tatively as we move from a non-targeted to a (strongly) targeted technology
policy.
To understand the economic mechanisms for these policy effects we first
focus on the non-targeted policy. The primary effect of the policy is to reduce
marginal investment costs of firms in region 2. Intuitively this should lead
to a reduction of unit costs and prices of firms in region 2 relative to those
in region 1, thereby improving the competitiveness of firms in region 2 and
shifting demand towards firms from that region. Based on this reasoning
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Figure 5: Effect of the different technology policies on global output (a),
output in region 1 (b) and output in region 2 (c) (color code: α = 0: black ,
α = 0.1: red, α = 0.2: green, α = 0.3: blue).
it should be expected that the policy has positive effects only or at least
primarily in region 2. In panel (a) of Figure 6 we depict the effect of the policy
on the ratio on output produced in region 1 and region 2. It can be seen that
the positive effect of the policy is indeed slightly larger in the target region
and hence convergence is fostered, but the effect is very minor. The reason
for this small effect is that the policy does not lead to a substantial increase
in competitiveness of firms in region 2. Only initially the policy induces an
increase of the ratio of prices charged by region 1 firms to that of region 2
firms. In the middle and long run the policy reduces this relative price making
firms in region 1 even more competitive (see Figure 6 (b)). To understand
this effect the dynamics on the labor market have to be considered. As can
be seen in panel (c) of Figure 6 the policy leads to a substantial increase of
the base wage offers of firms in region 2 relative to that in region 1. Since the
base wage determines the labor costs per productivity unit of a worker this
increase contributes to an increase of unit costs in region 2 relative to region
1. Considering our findings with respect to the effects of the policy on relative
prices we can conclude that this indirect wage effect of the introduction of
the subsidy actually outweighs the direct effect of the policy on investment
costs. As will become clear when we study the effects of the policy under
a more flexible labor market in region 2, the strong heterogeneity of firms
and workers in region 2 that emerges in the inflexible labor market setting
(see our discussion of the baseline scenario above) is a crucial factor for this
ambivalent policy effect. In particular, the low tech firms in region 2, face
problems to hire additional workers when they try to expand their production
after the introduction of the non-targeted subsidy, which further drives up
their base wage offers. Finally, in 6 (d) the effect of the policy on the ratio
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Figure 6: Effect of the non-targeted technology policy on relative output (a),
relative prices (b) relative base wage offer (c) and relative quality of capital
stock (d).
of the average quality of capital stocks of firms in region 1 relative to region
2 is considered. Here, the policy has no significant positive effect on the
technological convergence of region 2 firms toward those in region 1. The
small positive effect with respect to output convergence is fully driven by the
reduction of relative (investment) costs.
Having discussed the mechanisms underlying the effects of a non-targeted
technology policy we now consider how these effects change if the policy is
able to induce a certain fraction of firms in region 2 to adopt the frontier
technology. Figure 5 clearly shows that such targeted policies indeed can
foster convergence of the two regions in terms of real output. The effect
of output in the target region 2 is strongly positively affected whereas the
output produced in region 1 is decreased due to the policy.
When considering the comparison of effects across the different policies
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it should be kept in mind that in our model tax rates in the two regions are
dynamically adjusted such that public expenditures are covered by taxes.
In this sense all policies are self-financed and the differences are not due to
differences in inflow of public funds (e.g. due to credits from other regions
or supply of funds by the central bank).
The main reason for the positive convergence effects with respect to out-
put of the targeted technology policies is that, other than for the non-targeted
policies, a reduction of the technological gap between the two regions is
achieved. Figure 7 (a) shows that under targeted policies the ratio between
the average quality of physical capital in region 1 to that in region 2 declines
significantly, where the effect is stronger the more targeted the policy is.
Clearly, this effect is driven by the vintage choice of firms in region 2. The
increased productivity of these firms, however, also has a positive second or-
der effect for region 2, because it allows firms to expand production without
hiring new workers. This reduces the pressure on the labor market, which
was the main reason for the ambiguous effects of the non-targeted policy.
Panel (b) of Figure 7 shows that at least for large values of α the targeted
technology policies positively affect the ratio of base wage offers in the two
regions. Considering the effect in each of the regions (not shown here) it be-
comes clear that this observation is driven by a reduction of base wage offers
in region 2 due to the policy. For only weakly targeted policies implications of
the productivity increase on base-wage offers is not sufficiently large to out-
weigh the negative forces described for the non-targeted policy, and hence
the overall effect on relative base-wage offers is still slightly negative.
Together the positive effect of the targeted policies on productivity in
region 2 and the negative effects on labor costs leads to an increase in com-
petitiveness of firms in region 2, which is expressed by an increase of the
relative price of the good charged by firms in region 1 relative to those in
region 2 and a simultaneous catching-up of firms in region 2 with respect
to the mark-ups they can charge (see panels (c) and (d) in Figure 7). This
explains the partial shift of demand, and therefore production, from region 1
firms to region 2 firms. The positive overall effects of the targeted policies is
also mainly driven by the reduction in unit costs of production in region 2,
however it should also be taken into account that in a closed model like ours
the increased investment, that is induced by the policies, leads to an increase
in income of households (since they own the investment good producer) and
thereby strengthens demand.
We now turn to the effect of the considered technology policies on overall
inequality and the intra-regional distribution of income. As before we rely
on the Gini coefficient of current income of households in order to measure
income inequality. Using this indicator we obtain the following qualitative
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Figure 7: Effect of the different technology policies on relative quality of
technology in the two regions (a), relative base-wage offers (b), relative prices
(c), and relative mark-ups (d).
insight.
Result 2: All technology policies reduce the overall income inequality in the
economy. For a non-targeted policy inequality is persistently reduced only in
the high technology region. A sufficiently strongly targeted policy reduces in-
equality in the low technology region but makes the income distribution less
equal in the high technology region.
Panel (a) of Figure 8 shows the overall effect of the different policies on
income inequality in the whole economy. All policies decrease inequality
in the default scenario. A more equal overall economy emerges with the
technology policy for basically two reasons. First, the convergence process
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Figure 8: Effect of the different technology policies on the Gini coefficient of
income in the whole economy (a), in region 1 (b) and in region 2 (c) (color
code: α = 0: black , α = 0.1: red, α = 0.2: green, α = 0.3: blue).
between the two regions brings the average income levels of workers in region
2 closer to the average income of workers in region 1. Secondly, the technology
policy has a within region effect on income distribution. As is shown in panels
(b) and (c) of Figure 8 the effect of the policies on the inequality within a
region differs qualitatively between region 1 and the target region 2.
In region 2 the targeted policies bring more firms to the technological
frontier resulting in a reduction in heterogeneity between firms and more
equal wages for workers. To some extent the segregated labor market driven
by the firms’ productivity distribution is overcome. This can be illustrated
by considering the effect of the policies on the ratio of wage offers, specific
skills and output between the groups of firms with productivity above and
below the median. As can be seen in Figure 9 the targeted policies reduce
the ratio of the quality of physical capital between the two groups (see panel
(a)), which then allows more firms in the lower productivity group to hire
workers with an employment history at high-tech firms. This leads to a
reduction of heterogeneity with respect to specific skills between firms (panel
(b)) and reduces the strength of the phenomenon that low-tech firms have to
make higher base wage offers in order to be able to hire (panel (c)). Clearly,
the effects of the policies on base wage offers and specific skills increases
the incentives of firms in the lower part of the productivity distribution to
invest in high vintages, which reinforces the direct effect of the targeted
subsidies on vintage choice. For the non-targeted policy none of these effects
emerge since, as discussed above, this policy has no positive implications for
technology choice, that would trigger such second order effects.
Considering region 1, the first observation is that all effects of policies on
the inequality are much weaker than in the target region 2 (compare the pan-
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Figure 9: Effect of the different technology policies on ratios (high-tech/low-
tech firms) in region 2: quality of capital stock (a), specific skills (b) and
base-wage offers (c) (color code: α = 0: black , α = 0.1: red, α = 0.2: green,
α = 0.3: blue).
els (b) and (c) of Figure 8). For the non-targeted policy the induced change
in the Gini coefficient is only about 0.5%. For a weakly targeted policy the
effect is similarly small, but for α = 0.3 a more pronounced effect arises. Here
inequality in region 1 is increased and, as can be seen in Figure 10 the un-
derlying mechanism is a ’mirror image’ of what we observed in region 2. The
heterogeneity of firms in region 1 both with respect to the quality of physical
capital and with respect to specific skills increases. Considering the dynam-
ics of the distribution of these variables in the firm population in region 1
(not shown here) in the scenarios with and without policy it can clearly be
seen that the upper part of this distribution is hardly affected by the policy,
whereas the lower part becomes much more stretched out if the dynamics
is subject to the targeted technology policy. Put differently, the group of
firms staying very close to the frontier evolves in approximately the same
way in both scenarios. However under the targeted policy the competition
from firms in region 2 becomes stronger and this implies that some firms in
region 1, that initially are only slightly weaker than the technological leaders
invest at such a low rate that a considerable gap between their productivity
and the frontier emerges. This is a self-reinforcing process implying that the
firms at the frontier produce more output than in the scenario without the
technology policy, which leads to a higher labor demand and higher relative
base-wage offers of the high tech firms (see panel (c) of Figure 10). Overall,
this positive effect of the technology policy on firm heterogeneity in region 1
explains the induced increase in income inequality in region 1.
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Figure 10: Effect of the different technology policies on ratios (high-tech/low-
tech firms) in region 1: quality of capital stock (a), specific skills (b) and
base-wage offers (c) (color code: α = 0: black , α = 0.1: red, α = 0.2: green,
α = 0.3: blue).
4.4 The Role of Flexible Labor Markets
Our policy analysis in the previous subsection has been carried out under the
assumption that the labor markets in the low-tech target region 2 has similar
institutional characteristics as the labor market in the high-tech region 1.
Our results show that in such a setting the technology has to be targeted
and has to be able to induce a substantial fraction of firms in the target region
to invest along the technological frontier in order to foster convergence with
respect to output and to reduce income inequality in the target region. As has
been discussed in the Introduction many regions, at which cohesion policies
of this type are targeted, are, however, characterized by relatively low wage
replacement rates and strong incentives for workers to accept job-offers even
if they pay less than previous employments. It is therefore an important
question whether the qualitative findings of our previous discussion carry
over to a setting with higher flexibility of the labor market in region 2.
Before we study the effects of the different cohesion policies in the flexible
labor market setting we should however check, in how far the dynamics in
the baseline scenario without policy changes, if labor markets in region 2 are
more flexible.
Figure 11 shows the dynamics of regional output and Gini coefficients
in the flexible labor market scenario. Comparing this figure to Figure 2
it becomes obvious that the divergence of output between the two regions
is even more pronounced if labor markets in region 2 are flexible. On the
other hand, the difference in Gini coefficients is much smaller in this scenario.
Whereas inequality in the low-tech region is still larger compared to the high
tech region, the trajectories of Gini coefficients are much closer here compared
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Figure 11: Dynamics of output (a) and Gini coefficient (b) in both regions
to Figure 2 (b). Hence in terms of dynamics of the Gini coefficient the low-
tech region with flexible labor market lies between the low-tech region with
inflexible labor and the high-tech region. This observation as well as the
result that in terms of per capita output the low-tech region with flexible
labor market is below the low-tech region with inflexible labor market is
consistent with the empirical evidence shown in Figure 2.
The reason for these changes in the dynamics is that with flexible labor
markets the segregation of the workforce in region 2 into workers working
only for high-tech firms and others mainly working for low tech-firms, that
we observed in the baseline scenario, does not emerge. Due to the fast ad-
justment of reservation wages and lower replacement rates, workers who used
to work for high-tech firms are willing to accept offers from low-tech firms.
This implies for the low-tech firms in region 2 that they have higher chances
to hire workers with high specific skills and that they are less frequently
rationed on the labor market. Hence, the ratio of specific skills of workers
between high- and low-tech firms is much smaller and the ratio of base wage
offers between the two types of firms is much larger than in the baseline
scenario (see Figure 12 (a) and (c) compared to Figure 4. As can be seen in
panel (b) of this figure low-tech firms are now able to charge prices almost
identical to that of high-tech firms. Therefore, high-tech firms face stronger
competition both on the consumption goods and on the labor market. The
wage costs of these firms are therefore higher and the investments smaller
compared to the baseline scenario. The fact that a larger fraction of out-
put in region 2 is produced by firms using capital of relatively low quality
explains why the output in region 2 is smaller with flexible labor markets
compared to the baseline scenario. Furthermore these considerations imply
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Figure 12: relative wage offers (high-tech/low-tech firms) in R2 (a), relative
prices in R2 (b), relative level of specific skills in R2 (c) with a flexible labor
market in R2.
that the heterogeneity of the firm productivity is smaller in this scenario,
which explains that the trajectory of the regional Gini coefficient is below
that in the scenario with inflexible labor markets.
This discussion shows that the existence of a flexible labor market in the
low-tech region is not necessarily conducive for output convergence towards
the high-tech region. If we, however, consider the effects of the cohesion poli-
cies, it turns out that effects are more pronounced for regions with flexible
labor markets.
Result 3: The effects of the technology policies on output in region 1 is quali-
tatively identical under the inflexible and flexible labor market scenario. The
(positive) effects on output in region 2 is substantially stronger under a flex-
ible labor market.
Figure 13 illustrates how the effects of the policies differ between the
scenarios of an inflexible and a flexible labor market in region 2. Formally,
we show the penalized spline estimate of the interaction term sInt(t) from
equation (7). Whereas, the interaction effect with respect to output in region
1 is essentially zero, for output in region 2 we obtain a significant and growing
positive interaction effect for all considered policies. This means that the
positive implications for the output dynamics in region 2 are much more
pronounced if this region has a flexible labor market. In particular, for the
non-targeted policy the positive effect on output in region 2 is almost three
times stronger with flexible than with inflexible labor markets.
In order to understand the stronger effects of the policies in this scenario it
should be remembered that in the scenario with inflexible labor markets the
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Figure 13: Difference between the two labor market scenarios of the policy
effects on output in region 1 (a) and in region 2 (b)
main inhibitor for the policy is an upwards pressure on base-wages in region
2. This base-wage increase is to a large extend due to the frictions on the
labor market in region 2 that are implied by the combination of the strong
firm heterogeneity and the reluctance of workers to accepts jobs that pay
substantially less than the wage in their previous employment. As discussed
above, under flexible labor markets the firm heterogeneity is strongly reduced
and the frictions on the labor market are much smaller. Hence, the positive
effects of the technology policies on base-wage offers in region 2 are strongly
reduced and the policies have a much stronger positive impact on output
(and also technology) in the target region.
With respect to intra-regional income inequality we observe that the ef-
fects of the policies under flexible labor markets differ significantly from the
ones observed under inflexible labor markets.
Result 4: If the labor market in the low technology region is flexible, the
non-targeted policy reduces intra-regional income inequality in both regions,
whereas (strongly) targeted policies increase inequality in both regions. Ef-
fects on inequality are much stronger in region 1 than in the target region 2.
Overall inequality in the economy is reduced for all policies.
Result 4 is illustrated in Figure 14. In region 1 the effect on intra-regional
inequality of the policies is qualitatively similar to the effects arising if the
labor market in region 2 is inflexible (compare panels (b) of Figures 14 and 8).
In the target region the effects are however quite different. First it should be
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Figure 14: Effect of the different technology policies on the Gini coefficient
of income in the whole economy (a), in region 1 (b) and in region 2 (c) in
the flexible labor market scenario. (color code: α = 0: black , α = 0.1: red,
α = 0.2: green, α = 0.3: blue).
noted that the effects of the policies on the region 2 Gini coefficient are much
smaller than in the inflexible labor market scenario. Second, in particular
for the strongly targeted policies the inequality reducing effect disappears.
This is mainly due to the fact that under flexible labor markets the mobility
of workers between high- and low-tech firms is much stronger and therefore
there is no segregation of workers in groups working for high- and low-tech
firms, respectively. In such a scenario, due to the targeted policies more firms
invest at the frontier implying that all workers profit in a similar way rather
than that a large group of workers moves from the group of ’low-tech workers’
to the group of ’high-tech workers’ as it was observed in the inflexible labor
market scenario. Therefore, the policy does not have a strong inequality
reducing effect in region 2 under flexible labor markets. The reason for the
weak positive effect on the Gini coefficient in region 2 is that the high-tech
firms in region 2 profit slightly more from the expansion in demand triggered
by the subsidy. This leads to a small increase in the heterogeneity of the
firm population with respect to productivity, which implies an increase in
the income inequality. In spite of the fact that the targeted policies increase
intra-regional inequality in both regions the overall income inequality in the
economy is reduced due to positive implication of the policy for convergence.
The reduction of the average income difference between the regions dominates
the increase of inequality in the two regions.
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5 Conclusions
There are persistent and considerable gaps in income per capita across Euro-
pean countries. Moreover, countries with lower per capita incomes are facing
a more unequal distribution of incomes that has risen since the fall of the iron
curtain. It is a major goal of European policymakers to foster convergence of
incomes between and within regions. To this end sizable resources are spent
on transfers to weakly performing regions under the umbrella of the ERDF.
A prominently featuring policy is the subsidization of firms’ investments.
We investigated the effectiveness of such a policy with respect to the
convergence of regions and the income distribution under various scenarios
which are characterizing the target regions’ economic and institutional set-
ups. The conjecture was that it is by no means clear to what extent a
policy incentivizing firms to invest in better technologies can actually help
achieving the policy goals when countries may be lacking the human capital
to run this capital productively, do not have the public administration to
survey the correct use of the transfer, and may have labor markets that
function differently from those in the old member states. And indeed, our
model based analysis leads to a quite distinct picture of the likely effects that
we already summarized as Results in section 4.3.
Rather than replicating these results here, we would like to emphasize
the potentially insightful approach of using an agent-based macroeconomic
model for the evaluation of transfer policies. We believe that our simula-
tion based approach to evaluating (EU) policies is a complementary tool to
empirical studies. A model based analysis as ours makes it possible to look
into the effectiveness of policies under different time-horizons. Very often
empirical studies can only take a snap shot of the effects of the policy under
investigation. When it comes to policies that explicitly target long-run goals
such as economic convergence evaluation tools should be able to also look
into the longer run effects. A macroeconomic analysis with a sound micro-
foundation also let’s us analyze outcome variables which are of high policy
relevance for which real world data, however, very often does not exist or is of
poor quality. The poor data on income distributions may serve as an exam-
ple. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this agent-based macroeconomic
model allows for an investigation of the economic mechanisms underlying the
policy outcomes rather than leaving the policymaker with a statement that
the policy works or does not work without giving the reasons why this might
be so.
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Online-Appendix to
Cohesion Policy and Inequality Dynamics: Insights from a Het-
erogeneous Agents Macroeconomic Model
by Dawid, Harting and Neugart
The following tables give the default paramter setting used in the policy experiments discussed
in the paper. The robustness of our qualitative findings with respect to changes of numerous
key parameters has been examined and verified.
Table 1: Number of agents per region∗
Region 1 (R1): high tech Region 2 (R2): low tech
Households 800 800
Firms 40 40
Government 1 1
Banks 1 1
∗There is one investment good producer serving both regions, and one central bank
Table 2: Initialization of capital stock and skills
Region 1 (R1): high tech Region 2 (R2): low tech
Initial quality of capital stock 1.5 1.0
Initial specific skills 1.5 1.0
General skill distribution 0.8/0.2 0.2/0.8
Table 3: List of parameters.
Symbol Name Value
Consumption goods
κ Marginal propensity to save 0.01
Φ Target wealth/income ratio 16.67
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.01
χ Service level for the expected demand 0.8
γC Intensity of consumer choice 9.0
ρ Discount rate 0.02
Investment goods
∆qinv Technological progress 0.05
Continued on next page
Table 3 – continued from previous page
Symbol Name Value
λ Bargaining power of the capital goods producer 0.5
γv Logit parameter for vintage choice 30.0
S Time horizon for vintage choice 24
Credit market
TLoan Debt repayment period 18
ω Debt rescaling factor 0.0
rc ECB base rate 0.04
rd Deposit rate 0.009
Financial market
df Dividend earnings ratio 0.70
d¯ Threshold full dividends (firms) 0.5
αb Basel capital requirement 10
λfin Parameter price adjustment rule 1.0
pimin Ceiling on price growth rate 1.10
pimax Floor on price decrease rate 0.90
Labor market
ϕ Wage update 0.01
c Commuting costs 1.0
ηmonth Number applications 5
ηday Applications per day 3
%down Lower bound firing 0
%up Upper bound firing 0.1
γgen Logit parameter general skills 0.5
χ(bgenh = 1) Specific skills adaptation speed for low skilled workers 0.0125
χ(bgenh = 2) specific skills adaptation speed for high skilled workers 0.03703
Government
T Tax Time horizon for tax rate setting 72
sub Subsidy rate for investment policy 0.2
cf Share of subsidies jointly financed by all governments 1.0
Table 4: Labor market parameters for flexible and inflexible labor markets
Symbol Name Inflexible (default) Flexible
ψ Wage reservation update 0.01 0.25
u Unemployment benefit percentage 0.7 0.55
